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(11) THE PROPER STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
When the Industrial Commission has improperly denied a claim based on the 
misapplication of the law to the evidence and / or on the entry of erroneous findings of fact, this 
Court must set aside the Commission's denial of benefits and award the Claimant the sure and 
certain relief that is promised to him by Idaho Code 872-201 : 
This Court exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions and 
may substitute its view for the Commission's view. Kessler ex. Rel. Kessler v. 
Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859,934 P.2d 28,32 (1997). Although this Court 
may review the Commission's factual findings, this Court must limit its review to 
determining whether the Commission correctly denied benefits after it applied the 
law to the relevant facts. Id. Whether an injury arose out of the course of 
employment is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission. Id. The 
Commission's factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. I.C. 8 72-732; Neihart v. 
Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). 
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Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 344, 109 P.3d 
1084, 1086 (2005). Credibility of witnesses and evidence is a matter within the 
province of the Commission. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 51 3, 5 15,975 
P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). As such, the Commission's findings on weight and 
credibility will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Id. In making our determinations, this Court "must liberally 
construe the provisions of the worker's compensation law in favor of the 
employee, in order to serve the humane purposes for which the law was 
promulgated." Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 413, 18 P.3d 21 1, 218 
(2000) (citing Murray-Donahue v. Nat'l Car Rental Licensee Ass'n., 127 Idaho 
337, 340, 900 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1995)). Stevens- McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 
Idaho 325,328-329, 179 P.3d 288,291-292 (2008). 
(III) ARGUMENT 
(1) THE DEFENDANTS ADMITTED THAT CLAIMANT MET HLS PFC BURDEN 
OF PROOF 
The Defendants have argued in their 4.2.10 Response Brief that the Claimant failed to 
meet his burden of proving a prima facie case for a compensable occupational disease claim 
(Resp. Br., p. 11, L1. 6-11). However, the Defendants' argument is directtv contradicted by 
their prior admission to the Industrial Commission that the Claimant had met his burden of 
At best, with the opinion of Dr. Frizzell, Claimant has met his prima facia [sic] 
[facie] caseburden of proof (Def. 5.1.09 Resp. Br., p. 13, L1. 14-15). 
The admission of defense counsel that Claimant met his burden of proof is bindine on 
the Defendants: 
It is settled law in this state that a formal admission made by an attorney at trial is 
binding on his client as a solemn judicial admission. Hill v. Bice, 65 Idaho 167, 
139 P.2d 1010. See, Bell, Handbook of Evidence (1957), p. 159. It is well 
recognized that a judicial admission, applied to the judicial proceedings in which 
it is made, limits the issues upon which the cause is to be tried and obviates the 
necessity for proof of facts within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal 
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admission or stipulation so made. 31A C.J.S. Evidence 5 299, p. 765, 5 381e, p. 
926; 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence 4 615, p. 668; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), 
$5 2588,2590, pp. 586, 587. McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 
430 P.2d 670,674 (1967). 
The Claimant asked the Commission to amend paragraph 7 of its 6.8.09 decision to 
accurately reflect that the Defendants had already admitted that Claimant had met his PFC 
burden of proof (R., p., 104, '1/7(c), but the Commission failed to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in its 10.14.09 Order On Reconsideration which explained why it refused to 
apply the Defendants' binding admission against them (R., pp. 170-178). Based on this record, 
this Court cannot determine if the Commission abused its discretion: 
The test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion is: (1) 
whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley 
Shopping Center Znc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1991). 
(2) THE CLAIMANT MET HIS BURDEN OF PROVING A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
Even if the Defendants' bmding admission that the Claimant met his PFC burden of proof 
is not applied against them, the Claimant presented sufficient evidence to meet his burden of 
proof. Both the Claimant and the Defendants have defined the critical issue in this case to be 
causation: 
The critical dispute in this case is over whether the Claimant's exposure to the 
hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending caused the Claimant's 
lumbar spine degenerative disc disease? (App. Br., p. 17, L1. 18-20). 
*** 
As Claimant correctly notes, the fundamenfa1 dispute in this case is whether or 
not Claimant's job duties caused his lumbar degenerative disc disease (Resp. 
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Br., p. 9, L1. 11-13) (emphasis supplied). 
To prove causation in an occupational disease claim, the Claimant must satisfy the 
following standard: 
As with industrial accident claims, an occupational disease claimant has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, a causal 
connection between the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
occupational exposure to the substance or conditions which caused the alleged 
condition. Langley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 
786, 890 P.2d 732,737 (1995) (emphasis supplied). 
The Claimant was required to call Dr. Frizzell or Dr. Bates to testify at hearing or 
during a post- hearing deposition to meet his burden of proving causation: 
The Commission may not decide causation without opinion evidence from a 
medical expert. Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 997 P.2d 621 (2000). 
There is no absolute requirement, however, that the opinion evidence be presented 
by the expert testifying either at the hearing or by deposition. Id. A claimant can 
rely upon an opinion contained in a medical report to establish causation. 
Anderson v. Harper's Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006) 
(emphasis supplied). 
When the Industrial Commission examines the medical causation opinions that are 
expressed in medical reports, it must apply this Court's liberal causation standards: 
This Court has held that no special verbal forinula is necessary when a doctor's 
testimony plainly and unequivocally conveys his conviction that events are 
causally related. Jensen, 135 Idaho at 412-13, 18 P.3d at 217-18 (citing Paulson v. 
Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 901, 591 P.2d 143, 148 (1979), overruled 
on other grounds by Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 165, 997 P.2d 621, 
625 (2000) (holding that "To the extent Dean v. Dravo Corp., 95 Idaho 558, 511 
P.2d 1334 (1973) and Paulson . . . suggest a requirement of oral medical 
testimony in every case, the suggestion is disavowed.")). Rather even if a doctor 
expressly refuses to say the words "reasonable degree of medical probability," it 
can still be clear from his or her testimony that he or she considers that a 
claimant's injury more likely than not was caused by a work related accident. 
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Jensen, 135 Idaho at 412, 18 P.3d at 217. Stevens- McAtee, supra, 145 Idaho 325, 
334, 179 P.3d 288,297 (2008). 
Idaho Code 572-508 gives the Industrial Commission the authority to promulgate and 
adopt reasonable judicial rules which are binding in the adjudication of worker's compensation 
claims. 
I.C. fj 72-508 explicitly grants the Commission the authority to adopt rules 
governing judicialpractice andprocedure in front of the Commission. 
Idaho Code fj 72-508 states that: 
[Tlhe Commission shall have authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules 
and regulations for effecting the purposes of this [Workers' Compensation] act .... 
[T]he commission shall have authoritv to promulgate and adopt reasonable 
rules and reeulations involving iudicial matters .... Rules and regulation as 
promulgated and adopted, if not inconsistent with law, shall be binding in the 
administration of this law. Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 409, 1 1 1 P. 
3d 92,94 (2005) (emphasis supplied). 
The Industrial Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under The Idaho 
Workers' Comvensation Law (2004) allow the Claimant to meet his prima facie case (PFC) 
burden of proof by relying on medical opinions that are expressed in medical reports: 
"Prima facie" is the first appearance of evidence. A prima facie case is established 
by sufficient evidence to prove eligibility for benefits. See Rule 6. J.R.P. 1(B)(6). 
The party may establish such prima facie case by submitting affidavits, 
depositions, and/or medical reports to the Commission along with the party's 
application or, alternatively, it may file a request for hearing to establish a prima 
facie case. Proof of medical facts at hearing may be made in the manner set forth 
in Rule 10 below. J.R.P. 6(B). 
The Claimant offered 2 written reports from Dr. Frizzell and 1 written report from Dr. 
Bates into evidence at the 12.19.08 hearing in order to prove his prima facie case for a 
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compensable occupational disease claim (Ex. 8, pp. 008039-008042) (Ex. 7, pp. 007016- 
007017). All 3 of the Claimant's prima facie case medical reports were admitted into evidence 
without objection from the Defendants (Tr., p. 6, L. 4 - p. 7, L. 8). 
Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates both read the Claimant's written job description (Ex. 3), 
addressed each element in the prima facie case for a compensable occupational disease claim 
and plainly and unecruivocallv expressed their conviction that the Claimant was suffering 
from a non-acute lumbar spine occupational disease that was caused bv his exposure to the 
hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending which were characteristic of and 
peculiar to his Sawyer /Assembler job at Joslin Millwork (Ex. 8, pp. 008039-008042) (Ex. 7, p. 
The medical opinions set forth in Dr. Frizzell's and Dr. Bates' properly disclosed pre- 
hearing medical reports were unrebutted at the time of the 12.19.08 hearing and satisfied this 
Court's standards for proving the elements of an occupational disease claim: 
An occupational disease is one that is "due to the nature of an employment in 
which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of, and peculiar 
to the trade, occupation, process, or employment . . ." LC. $ 72-102(18)(a). [now 
I.C. $72-102(22)(a)]. "Contracted" and "incurred," when referring to an 
occupational disease, are deemed equivalent to "arising out of and in the course of 
employment." LC. $ 72-102(18)(b) (quotations omitted) [now I.C. $72- 
102(22)(b)]. 
As with industrial accident claims, an occupational disease claimant has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, a causal 
connection between the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
occupational exposure to the substance or conditions which caused the alleged 
condition. Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 598, 798 P.2d 55, 
57 (1990). Langley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 
786,890 P.2d 732,737 (1995) (emphasis supplied). 
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*** 
Idaho Code § 72-102(21)(b) [now 1.C. $72-102(22)(b)] defines the word at issue, 
stating that "'[clontracted' and 'incurred,' when referring to an occupational 
disease, shall be deemed the equivalent of the term 'arising out of and in the 
course of employment." 
Because in Idaho's worker's compensation law the word "incurred" means 
"'arising out of and in the course of employment," it is as much a reference to 
cause as to a particular point in time. See I.C. 3 72-102(21)(b). As an occupational 
disease develops over time, it is possible for the disease to be "incurred" by a 
claimant under a series of different employers before it becomes manifest. 
Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 456, 11 1 P.3d 135, 
141 (2005). 
Although the Commission did not explicitly find that the Claimant had met his burden of 
proving a prima facie case for an occupational disease claim, the Commission imvliedlv found 
that the Claimant presented sufficient evidence to meet his prima facie case burden of proof: 
First, Claimant argues that the Commission erred when it concluded Claimant 
failed to prove his lumbar spine injury was an occupational disease incurred at 
work. Claimant contends that he presented ovenvhelmin~ evidence to vrove 
his case. Claimant's testimonv, Dr. Frizzell's letter. and other evidence 
supaort Claimant's armment. The Commission acknowledees that Claimant 
presented evidence to suvvort his case, but the Commission was not persuaded 
by Dr. Frizzell's opinion. (R. , p. 173, L1. 9-14) (emphasis supplied). 
When viewed in context of the entire case, the Commission was versuaded by 
Dr. Weiss's observations and opinions that Claimant's suffered from preexisting 
degenerative disease and facet joint arthropathy (R., p. 173, LL. 19-2l)(emphasis 
supplied). 
The Commission acknowledged that the Claimant presented sufficient evidence to prove 
his prima facie case and did deny this claim on the grounds that the Claimant failed to meet 
his burden of proof. The Commission denied this claim based on its misapplication of the law 
because it unfairly weighed Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different post-hearing deposition opinions 
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(which were not prowerlv disclosed by the Defendants prior to the 12.19.08 hearing) aeainst 
the properly disclosed opinions set forth in Dr. Frizzell's 5.5.08 PFC medical report (Ex., p. 
008039-008040) '. Based on the Defendants' admission and the Commission's implied fmding, 
there was no substantial and competent evidence in the record at the time of hearing to support 
the Commission's legal conclusion that the "Claimant has failed to prove that the need for his 
lumbar surgery is the result of an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his 
employment." (R., p. 96,T 1 of Conclusions of Law). 
(3) THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO REBUT THE CLAIMANT'S PRIMA FACIE 
CASE WITH EVIDENCE THAT WAS PROPERLY DISCLOSED PRIOR TO 
THE 12.19.08 HEARING 
The Preamble to the J.R.P. states that the following rules of procedure shall govern 
judicial matters that come before the Industrial Commission: 
By virtue of the authority vested in the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho 
Code $8 72-508 and 72-707, the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho 
hereby adopts the following rules of wrocedure governing iudicial matters 
under its jurisdiction as provided by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 





Parties may obtain discoverv by one or more of the following methods: 
depositions by oral examination or written questions, written interrogatories, or 
reauests for production of documents or t h w .  
B. 
Requests for admissions shall not be allowed. This provision notwithstanding, the 
' See Arguments 5-8, in*, at pp. 19-32 for an explanation of how the Industrial Commission misapplied the law when it 
niSairly weighed Dr. Weiss' 14 new post-hearing deposition opinions that were disclosed pre-hearing against Dr. Frizzell's 
properly disclosed pre-hearing opinions. 
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parties may agree to admit facts prior to hearing. 
C. 
Procedural matters relating to discovery, except sanctions, shall be controlled 
bv the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(emphasis supplied). 
J.R.P. 7(A) gave the Claimant the right to serve written interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents on the Defendants. J.R.P. 7(C) gave the Claimant the right to serve the 
Defendants with an I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) ex~ert  witness disclosure interrogatory because it 
expressly states that procedural matters relating to discovery (like pre-hearing expert witness 
disclosures) shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Defendants argue that the expert witness disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4) do apply to the adjudication of workers compensation claims because the "Claimant 
cites no case in support of this proposition" (Resp. Br., p. 15, L. 8). The Defendants also make 
the argument that this Court's holding in Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154,45 P.3d 810 (2002) does 
not apply to workers' compensation claims because "Clark is a civil case that has nothing 
whatsoever to do with workers [sic] [workers'] compensation" (Resp. Br., p. 13, f.n. 11). 
The Defendants' arguments are directly contradicted by the plain language of J.R.P. 7 
which expressly states that procedural matters (like pre-trial expert witness disclosures) &&l 
be ~overned by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Code 972-508 states that the pre- 
hearing discovery rules of J.R.P. 7 shall be bind in^ in the adjudication of workers' 
compensation claims. Emery, supra, 141 Idaho 409, 11 I P.3d 94 (2005). The Court should 
reject the Defendants' arguments that I.R.C.P. 26@)(4), I.R.C.P. 26(e) and this Court's holding 
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in Clark do not apply to workers' compensation claims because the Defendants' position is 
directly contradicted by the plain language of Idaho Code 572-508 and J.R.P. 7. 
The Claimant served the Defendants with pre-hearing discovery to force the Defendants 
to make full are-hearine disclosure of all adverse facts and all adverse medical opinions that 
the Defendants were relying on to support their contentions, denials and affirmative defenses to 
this occupational disease claim. 
"The to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both 
fundamental and comprehensive. * * * The very intezritv of the judicial 
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the 
facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To insure that Justice is 
done, it is imperative to the function of courts that comuulsorv process be 
available for the production of evidence needed either by the pr~secution or by 
the defense. Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288,293,562 P.2d 791, 
796 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 418, 54 L.Ed.2d 291 (1977) 
(emphasis supplied). 
The Claimant's contention interrogatories 7-12 addressed each element in the prima 
facie case for an occupational disease claim (R., pp. 1-7) (Ex. 12, pp. 012005-012010). 
Claimant's interrogatory 7 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disclosure of 
all facts relevant to the causation issue. 
Claimant's interrogatory 8 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disclosure of 
all facts relevant to the affliction of a disease element-of an occupational disease claim. 
Claimant's interrogatory 9 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disdlosure of 
all facts relevant to the characteristic of and peculiar to element of an occupational 
disease claim. 
Claimant's interrogatory 10 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disclosure 
of all facts relevant to the exposure element of an occupational disease claim. 
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Claimant's interrogatory 11 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disclosure 
of all facts relevant to the contracted / incurred element of an occupational disease 
claim. 
Claimant's interrogatory 12 required the Defendants to make full pre-hearing disclosure 
of all facts relevant to the actual and total incapacity element of the PFC. 
The Defendants did not disclose a single adverse fact to rebut the Claimant's PFC proof 
when they gave the same evasive answer to interrogatories 7-12: 
ANSWER: Defendants continue to evaluate and investigate Claimant's medical 
condition as it relates to his alleged occupational disease. Please see the 
documents attached to Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request for 
Production for documents obtained to date. Once Defendants have confumed that 
all medical records have been received and reviewed in their entirety, this Answer 
will be supplemented (Ex. 12, pp. 0 12006-01201 0). 
Based on the Defendants' failure to disclose any adverse facts, the following facts 
presented by he Claimant were uncontroverted at the 12.19.08 hearing: 
The Claimant did not have any prior low back injuries caused by accidents before going 
to work for Joslin; 
The Claimant did not suffer from a preexisting occupational disease in his low back that 
had manifested itself before going to work for Joslin; 
The Claimant was not involved in any new accidents that caused injury to his low back 
after going to work for Joslin; 
The Claimant did not engage in any physical activities outside of work that could be 
implicated in the cause of lumbar spine degenerative disc disease; 
Before he became exposed to the peculiar and characteristic hazards of his Sawyer / 
Assembler job, the Claimant's 12.13.05 lumbar spine X-ray was completely "negative 
for pathology "; 
After his 12.13.05 base-line X-ray was taken, the Claimant switched jobs to Sawyer / 
Assembler and became exposed to the hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and 
bending in a confined space at the very fast pace of the production cycle; and, 
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After being exposed to the Sawyer / Assembler hazards for approximately 18 months, the 
Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI showed advanced degenerative changes at the L4-5 and L5-S1 
levels of the Claimant's lumbar spine including, but not limited to, degenerative joint 
disease, facet arthritis and an L5-S1 disc herniation with extruded fragment that caused 
left lower extremity radiculopathy 2. 
Claimant's interrogatory 5 required the Defendants to make all of the pre-hearing expert 
witness disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4): 
a. The Defendants were required to make full pre-hearing disclosure of a 
complete statement of all ovinions to be expressed by Dr. Weiss in this case; 
b. The Defendants were required make full pre-hearing disclosure of a complete 
statement of the bases and reasons for Dr. Weiss' opinions; and, 
c. The Defendants were required to make full vre-hearing disclosure of a 
complete statement of all data or other information considered by Dr. Weiss 
in forming the opinions (Ex. 12, pp. 012003-012004). 
The Defendants 7.8.08 answer to interrogatory 5 did not provide any of the pre-hearing 
expert witness disclosure information required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4): 
ANSWER: Defendants have not retained any expert they expect to testify at 
hearing as of this date. Upon identification of any such expert, this Interrogatory 
answer will be supplemented (Ex. 12, p. 012005). 
On 10.10.08, the Defendants supplemented their 7.8.08 answer to interrogatory 5 by 
serving the Claimant with a copy of Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report (R., p. 80). Dr. Weiss' 
10.1.08 IME report contained 1 medical opinion and 3 generic observations: 
The citations to the record which verify these unconhoverted facts are set forth at pp. 9-15 of the Statement of Facts in the 
Appellant's 3.9.10 Opening Brief on appeal. 
The Defendanls' 10.10.08 supplemental answer to interrogatory 5 is not part of Ex. 12, but the Defendants' supplemental 
answer merely referred the Claimant to Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IMF, report. 
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(1) It is within the standard of community practice for the Claimant to have 
the back surgery recommended by Dr. Frizzell (case spec* medical 
opinion); 
(2) Back pain and spinal arthritis are common in the general population 
(generic observation with no application to this Claimant or the hazards 
of his job); 
(3) Heavy work is called exercise and exercise is generally thought to be 
beneficial (generic observation with no application to this Claimant or 
the hazards of his job); and, 
(4) Sedentary workers have high rates of back pain complaint and disability 
(generic observation with no application to this Claimant or the hazards 
ofhis job) (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014009). 
The Defendants never supplemented the pre-hearing expert witness disclosures in Dr. 
Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report as required by I.R.C.P. 26(e). The Claimant had the fundamental 
right to rely on the Defendants' representation that Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report constituted 3 
complete statement of all opinions to be exuressed" by Dr. Weiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
Our discovery rules were designed to prevent sururise at trial, Pearce v. Ollie, 
121 Idaho 539, 552, 826 P.2d 888, 901 (1992), and _discovery rules regarding 
expert witnesses were designed to promote fairness and candor, see Radmer, 
120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.2d at 900. Effective cross-examination and rebuttal of 
expert witnesses requires advanced preparation and knowledge of that expert's 
testimony. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338, 349 (2006) 
(emphasis supplied). 
Since the Defendants failed to present any evidence to contradict the Claimant's PFC 
evidence, the record before the Commission at the 12.19.08 heaimg did not contain substantial 
and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding that the "Claimant has failed to 
prove that the need for his lumbar surgery is the result of an occupational disease arising out of 
and in the course of his employment" (R., p. 9 6 , I l  of Conclusions of Law). This Court should 
reverse the Commission's unsupported finding. 
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(4) THE CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AT HEARING 
After the Claimant met his burden of proving a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the 
Defendants to come forward at hearing and present substantial and competent adverse evidence 
to rebut the Claimant's proof or suffer whatever judgment the prima facie evidence would 
support: 
What is intended is, when the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, 
defendant must meet it with countervailing proof or suffer whatever 
judgment the urima facie proof will suu~ort. Miller v. Belknap, 75 Idaho 
46,51,266 P.2d 662,665 (1954) (emphasis supplied). 
Based on the evidence in the record at the time of the 12.19.08 hearing, the Claimant was 
entitled to an award of benefits as a matter of law. In the case of Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch 
Covp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008), this Court reversed the Industrial Commission's 
legal conclusion that the Claimant failed to prove that his herniated disc was caused by an 
accident because employer / surety did & come forward at hearing and present substantial and 
competent adverse evidence to contradict the Claimant's PFC proof: 
Here, neither Potlatch nor Surety offers any substantial evidence to contradict 
McAtee's production of medical evidence which indicates that his acute onset of 
pain during his work shift on March 9, 2004, represented an acute change in his 
condition corresponding with the onset of his disc herniation. Stevens- McAtee, 
supra, 145 Idaho 325,333, 179 P.3d 288,296 (2008) (emphasis supplied). 
At the time of the 12.19.08 hearing, the Defendants in this case had not disclosed a 
single adverse fact or a single adverse medical opinion to contradict the Claimant's prima facie 
case burden of proof. Therefore, this Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's denial of 
this claim and award worker's compensation benefits to the Claimant as a matter of law. Failure 
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to rebut the PFC means that the Defendants should "suffer whatever judgment the prima facie 
proof will support" Miller, supra, at 75 Idaho 51,266 P. 2d 266 (1954). 
(5) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 14 NEW 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY DR. WEISS DURING HIS POST-HEARING 
DEPOSITION WERE JUST MERE EXPLANATIONS OF HIS PRE-HEARING 
OPINIONS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
Through reasoning which is still incomprehensible to the Claimant, the Industrial 
Commission somehow managed to find that the 14 new and / or different medical opinions 
ex~ressed for the first time by Dr. Weiss during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition did not 
constitute "new" medical opinions at all, but instead were just mere "explanations" of the 1 
medical opinion and 3 generic observations disclosed by the Defendants in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 
IME report: 
Further, we find the explanations in the deposition do notinvolve new medical 
causation opinions (R., p. 177, L1. 1-2) (emphasis supplied). 
Although the Claimant explained why the Industrial Commission's reasoning was faulty 
at pages 23-25 of his 3.9.10 Appellant's Brief, the Defendants have adopted the Industrial 
Commission's fallacious reasoning by arguing that Dr. Weiss did not create, manufacture or 
develop any new medical opinions during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition: 
First, Dr. Weiss did not "create" any opinions post-hearing. W e  his deposition 
testimony admittedly is lengthier than his IME report, the two do not differ in any 
meaningful way. The deposition testimony simply provides the analytic 
framework Dr. Weiss used when formulating his opinions (Resp. Br., p. 13, L1.7- 
10). 
The Commission's conclusion that Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different post-hearing deposition 
opinions "do not involve new medical causation opinions" (R., p. 177, L1. 1-3) should only be 
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upheld on ameal if the record confirms that all 14 of Dr. Weiss' new / different post-hearing 
deposition opinions that the Commission expressly reIied to deny this claim were ~ r o ~ e r l v  
disclosed and set forth in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report. 
If Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different post-hearing deposition opinions did goJ appear in Dr. 
Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report, then it is axiomtic that they can only be treated as "new" I 
"different" opinions and the Commission's erroneous conclusion to the contrary must be set 
aside because it is not supported by any substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
Pre-Hearing Disclosures In Dr. Weiss' vs. New Post-Hearing Dcuosition Opinions 
IME Re~ort  From Dr. Weiss That the Commission 
Relied on to Denv This Claim 
1. It is within the standard of community 
practice for the Claimant to have the back 
surgery recommended by Dr. Frizzell (case 
specific medical opinion); 
2. Back pain and spinal arthritis are 
common in the general population (generic 
observation); 
3. Heavy work is called exercise and 
exercise is generally thought to be beneficial 
(generic observation); and, 
4. Sedentary workers have high rates of 
back pain complaint and disability (generic 
observation) (Ex. 14, Bates No. 014009). 
1. It was not possible to determine when 
the fiee fragment occurred, but the Claimant's 
physical findings do not support the conclusion 
that his free fragment of disc material was 
causing his back pain (R., p. 93, 79, L. 7 - p. 
94, L. 2); 
2. It is difficult to say what is causal in 
something that everybody has (R., p. 93, 79, 
Ll. 3-4); 
3. Dr. Weiss did not see any connection 
between the Claimant's need for back surgery 
and his employment (R., p. 94, f 10, L1. 1-2); 
4. Dr. Weiss was troubled &at there was 
no specific event that could be temporally 
related to the onset of Claimant's back pain 
(R., p. 94,710, Ll. 3-4); 
5. High impact activities can lead to the 
progression of underlying arthritis, but do not 
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actually cause the underlying arthritis (R., p. 
94,110, L1.4-5); 
6-10. Degenerative disc disease may be 
caused by (6) heredity, (7) age, (8) diet, (9) 
smoking or (10) obesity (R., p. 94,711, L1. 13- 
14); 
11. Dr. Weiss render [sic] [rendered] a well- 
reasoned expert opinion which opined that 
Claimant's degenerative disc disease and facet 
arthritis developed over time (R., p. 171, L1. 9- 
11); 
12. When viewed in context of the entire 
case, the Commission was persuaded by Dr. 
Weiss's observations and opinions that 
Claimant suffered from preexisting 
degenerative disease and facet joint 
arthropathy (R., p. 173, L1. 19-21); 
13. According to Dr. Weiss, Claimant's 
multilevel degenerative disc disease and facet 
arthritis took place over years and years, and 
was not something that came on acutely in 
November of 2007. Dr. Weiss's Depo. pp. 19, 
23 (R., p. 174, Ll. 20-22); and, 
14. The Commission adopted Dr. Weiss's 
opinion that Claimant's underlying 
degenerative joint disease and arthritis were 
not caused by his work (R., p. 174, L1.8-9). 
This side-by-side comparison conclusively proves that none of Dr. Weiss' 14 the new / 
different post-hearing opinions relied on by the Commission to deny this claim were pro~erly 
disclosed and set forth in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report. The Commission did not have any 
substantial and competent evidence in the record to support its conclusion that Dr. Weiss' post- 
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hearing deposition opinions "do not involve new medical causation opinions" and that 
conclusion should be reversed on appeal. 
(6) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE LAW WHEN IT 
DENIED THE CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE UNDISCLOSED MEDICAL 
OPINIONS 
A. The Claimant's I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) Motion To Strike 
The Defendants argue that medical experts in worker's compensation claims are special 
experts that are somehow exempt from the pre-hearing expert witness disclosure requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 26@)(4) and Dr. Weiss should not be '@reeluded from expanding upon, explaining, 
or otherwise altering the opinions disclosed in exhibits prior to hearing" when he testified 
during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition (Resp. Br., p. 13, L1. 12-14) (emphasis supplied). 
The Claimant strongly disagrees with the Defendants' argument that Dr. Weiss had the 
right to "expand upon" or "alter" the 1 opinion and 3 generic observations set forth in his 
10.1.08 IME report without first making proper supplemental pre-hearing disclosures that are 
required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4): 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) provides that a party can request that the 
opposing party set forth the identity of the opposing party's expert witnesses 
the substance of the experts' opinions. Rule 26(e) imposes a duty on garties to 
seasonablv update interrogatory responses and provides that the "trial court 
may exclude the testimonv of witnesses or the admission of evidence pJ 
disclosed by a required supplementation of the responses of the party." 
This Court has previously held that a trial court abused its discretion and 
committed reversible error bv allowing expert testimonv. which was not 
properly disclosed in violation of Rule 26. Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 
86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991) ... 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by 
allowing Pool to testify regarding his reconstruction theory. In its analysis of the 
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issue, this Court quoted the language of I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l), stating that the rule 
"unambiguously imposes a continuing dutv to supplement responses to 
discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's 
testimony where the initial responses have been reiected, modified. expanded 
upon. or otherwise altered in some manner." Id. (citations omitted). This Court 
then quoted the advisory committee to the federal rules, which in reference 
F.R.C.P. 26 provides: 
In cases of this character a prohibition against discovery of infomation held by 
expert witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has been 
created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert witness reauires 
advance preaaration . . . . Similarly, effective rebuttal reauires advance 
knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side. If the latter is foreclosed by 
a rule against discovery, the narrow in^ of issues and elimination of surprise 
which discovery normally produces are frustrated. Id. (quoting Advisory 
Committee Notes, rule 26, Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.) (alterations in 
original) Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156-158, 45 P.3d 810, 812-814 (2002) 
(emphasis supplied). 
The Defendants' argument that Dr. Weiss had the right to modify, expand upon or 
otherwise alter the 1 opinion and 3 observations in his 10.1.08 report without first making proper 
pre-hearing supplemental disclosure as required by I.R.C.P. 26(e) is directly contradicted by this 
Court's holding in Clark and should be rejected. Since Clark was decided in 2002, this Court 
has consistently applied the pre-trial expert witness disclosure requirements of I.R.C.P. 26@)(4) 
and I.R.C.P. 26(e) to promote fairness and candor in all kinds of civil proceedings where expert 
witnesses are involved. See Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176,219 P.3d 1192 (2009). 
If Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different post-hearing opinions are allowed to remain in the record 
of this case, the Claimant will be stripped of the following rights: 
The Claimant will be stripped of his right to effectiveiv prepare for the cross 
examination of Dr. Weiss during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition; 
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The Claimant will be stripped of his right to right to obtain effective vre-hearing 
rebuttal oninion from Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates because Dr. Weiss' 14 new post- 
hearing deposition opinions were & properly disclosed prior to the 12.19.08 hearing in 
Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report. Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates could not rebut new post- 
hearing opinions which they had not seen. The opinions in Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08 
rebuttal report (Ex.8, p. 008041-008042) and Dr. Bates' 12.4.08 rebuM report (Ex. 7, p. 
007016-007017) were necessarily limited in scope to responding to the information in Dr. 
Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report. 
The Claimant will be stripped of his right to use pre-hearing interrogatories as a tool of . - - - - 
compulsory process to narrow the factual and legal issues for hearing and eliminate 
the unfair surprise at hearing which results from a post-hearing ambush attack of new 
/ different medical opinions. 
The pre-hearing discovery and expert witness disclosure rules of J.R.P. 7(A), J.R.P. 7(C) 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 26(e) are bind in^ on the Commission. The Industrial Commission 
denied the Claimant's I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 26(e) Motion To Strike without making 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law which would explain why the Commission refused to 
apply the expert witness pre-hearing disclosure standards of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 26(e) 
to the facts of this case and exclude all of Dr. Weiss' new / different post-hearing medical 
opinions (R., pp. 176-177). 
This arbitrary ruling without findings constituted an abuse of discretion under the 
standards of Sun Valley, supra, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The 
Commission's denial of Claimant's Motion To Strike based on I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 
26(e) should be reversed and all of Dr. Weiss' post-hearing opinions that were not properly 
disclosed in his 10.1.08 IME report should be excluded from evidence. 
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B. The Claimant's J.R.P. 10(E)(4) Motion To Strike 
The Industrial Commission gave the Defendants an unfair advantage in this case by 
allowing the Defendants to create, develop and / or manufacture at least 14 new / different 
medical opinions from Dr. Weiss during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition that were not 
properlv disclosed by the Defendants prior to the 12.19.08 hearing in Dr. Weiss's 10.1.08 IME 
report in direct violation of J.R.P. 10(E)(4). The Claimant filed a Motion To Strike all 
undisclosed post-hearing opinions from Dr. Weiss that did not appear in his 10.1.08 IME report, 
but the Commission misapplied the post-hearing deposition exclusionary rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) 
and denied the Claimant's Motion To Strike: 
Unless the Commission, for good cause shown, shall otherwise order at or before 
the hearing, the [medical opinion1 evidence uresented bv uost-hear in^ 
deposition shall be [medical opinion1 evidence known bv or available to the 
partv at the time of the hearing and shall not include [medical oninion1 
evidence develoued. manufactured, or discovered follow in^ the hearing. 
Experts testifying post-hearing may base an opinion on exhibits and evidence 
admitted at hearing but not on evidence developed following hearing, except on a 
showing of good cause and order of the Commission. Lay witness rebuttal 
evidence is only admissible post-hearing in the event new matters have been 
presented and the Commission so orders. J.R.P. 10(E)(4) (emphasis supplied) 
[medical opinion supplied]. 
The exclusionary rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) is not ambiguous. The medical opinion 
evidence that is being presented to the Commission by post-hearing deposition shall be medical 
opinion evidence that was known bv or available to the parties at the time of hearing. If the 
medical opinion evidence is created, developed or manufactured after the hearing, it is not 
admissible during a post-hearing deposition and must be excluded from the evidence pursuant 
to the exclusionary rule of J.R.P. lOQ(4). 
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Since none of the 14 new / different medical opinions that the Commission relied on to 
deny this claim appeared in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report, it is axiomatic that they were 
created, developed or manufactured after the 12.19.08 hearing and, therefore, could not have 
been known by or available to the Claimant at the time of hearing. 
The Defendants cite the case of Lorca-Merono v. Yokes Washington Foods, Inc., 137 
Idaho 446, 50 P.3d 461 (2002) for the proposition that the Industrial Commission did not 
misapply J.R.P. 10(E)(4) when it admitted Dr. Weiss' post-hearing opinions into evidence (Resp. 
Br., p. 14, LL. 2-18). The Defendants' reliance on the holding from Lorca-Merono is misplaced: 
The Commission overruled Claimant's objection to Dr. Linder's deposition 
testimony on the grounds that Claimant had failed to identify any document 
provided to Dr. Linder after the hearing that was not known at the time of the 
hearing, that on direct examination Dr. Linder essentially repeated the diagnoses 
and conclusions contained in his medical reports that had been admitted into 
evidence at the hearing, and that the majority of his deposition testimony was 
developed during cross-examination by Claimant's counsel. On appeal, 
Claimant has not identified any diagnosis or opinion rendered by Dr. Linder 
during his deposition testimony that differed from the diagnoses and 
opinions contained in his earlier reports. Lorca-Mevono v. Yokes Washington 
Foods, Inc., 137 Idaho 446,454,50 P.3d 461,469 (2002) (emphasis supplied). 
The fundamental distinction between the facts of this case and Lorca-Merono is that the 
Claimant in this case has not only s~ecificallv identified at least 14 new / different medical 
opinions issued by Dr. Weiss during his 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition that were new / 
different from the 1 opinion and 3 generic observations set forth in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME 
report, the Claimant established that the Commission relied on each of these 14 new / different 
post-hearing opinions to deny this claim. Based on the facts in the record in this case, the 
Industrial Commission clearly misapplied the exclusionary rule of J.R.P. 10(E)(4) and this 
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Court's holding in Lorca-Merono when it denied the Claimant's Motion To Strike. This ruling 
should be reversed. 
J.R.P. 7(A), J.R.P. 7(C), I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), I.R.C.P. 26(e) and J.R.P. 10(E)(4) are all in 
pari materia and should be construed consistently with each other because they all relate to the 
standards which govern the pre-hearing disclosure and admissibility of expert opinion evidence. 
Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the literal words of the 
statute. Grand Canyon Dories v. Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 5, 855 P.2d 462,466 
(1993). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Id. Where statutes are in pari materia (relating to the same subject 
matter), they should be construed together to give effect to legislative intent. 
Dewey v. Merrill, 124 Idaho 201,204, 858 P.2d 740,743 (1993). State, Dep't of 
Health Weware ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P. 2d 727, 730 
(1995). 
The Commission misapplied these rules when it refused to exclude all post-hearing 
opinions from Dr. Weiss that the Defendants did not properly disclose prior to hearing and 
consequently could not have been known by or available to the.Claimant at the time of hearing. 
The Commission's ruling denying Claimant's Motion To Strike should be reversed. 
(7) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE LAW BY UNFAIRLY 
WEIGHING DR. WEISS' 14 NEW AND I DIFFERENT POST-HEARING 
OPINIONS AGAINST DR. FRIZZELL'S PROPERLY DISCLOSED PRE- 
HEARING OPINIONS 
The Defendants have oversimplified the issues in this case and would like the Court to 
believe that this is just a simple case where the Commission properly weighed the opinions of the 
medical experts and then exercised its discretion to find Dr. Weiss' opinions more persuasive: 
The crux of this case boils down to the Industrial Commission finding the 
analyses and opinions of Respondents' expert, Dr. Weiss, more persuasive than 
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those of Claimant's expert, Dr. Roy Tyler Frizzell (Resp. Br., p. 9, L1. 24- p. 10, 
L. 1). 
[I]t is the Commission's relative weighing of the opinions of Dr. Weiss and Dr. 
Frizzell upon which the case turned (Resp. Br., p. 26, L1.20-22). 
The Claimant realizes that the Commission is free to determine the relative weight to 
assign to the opinions of the medical experts. Lorca-Merono, supra, 137 Idaho 451, 50 P.3d 466 
(2002). However, the Commission is not free to unfairly perform its weighing analysis like it 
did in this case. To be fair to both parties, the Commission must only compare the medical 
opinions fkom the parties' medical experts which have been prowerlv disclosed prior to the 
hearing and are known bv and available to the parties at the time of hearing. 
The medical opinions that had been properly disclosed and were known by and available 
to the parties at the time of hearing consisted of the following 4 reports: 
1. Dr. Frizzell's 5.5.08 PFC medical report (Ex. 8, pp. 008039-008041); 
2. Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report (Ex. 14, pp. 014005-014009); 
3. Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08. rebuttal of Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report (Ex. 8, pp. 008041- 
008042); and, 
4. Dr. Bates' 12.4.08 rebuttal of Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report (Ex. 7, pp. 007016-007017). 
If the Commission had properly limited the scope of its medical opinion weighing 
analysis to those 4 reports, the only legal conclusion supported by the evidence in the record was 
that the Claimant had met his burden of proving a compensable occupational disease claim and 
the Defendants had failed to rebut his PFC evidence. Therefore, Claimant was entitled to benefits 
as a matter of law. 
The Defendants criticize the Claimant for not taking Dr. Frizzell's post-hearing 
deposition (Resp. Br., p. 17, L1. 7-8). However, the Claimant's decision to forego Dr. Frizzell's 
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post-hearing deposition must be evaluated in the context of the extremelv limited medical 
opinion evidence that the Defendants disclosed prior to hearing in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report 
and was "known by and available to" the Claimant at the time of hearing. 
Based on Dr. Weiss' 1 opinion that surgery was appropriate and the 3 generic 
observations in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report, there was absolutely no reason for the Claimant 
to invest $3,300.00 to pay Dr. Frizzell to testify at a post-hearing deposition (R., p. 155, L1. 29- 
36). The Claimant had the right to expect that the Industrial Commission would properly limit 
the Defendants' medical opinion evidence to the information in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 report 
pursuant to J.R.P. 10Q(4), I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) and I.R.C.P. 26(e). 
The Industrial Commission misapplied the law when it allowed the Defendants to 
the Claimant into hearing based on 1 set of known facts and medical opinions and then &$& 
the medical evidence in the case after the 12.19.08 hearing and ambush the Claimant with at 
least 14 new / different medical opinions from Dr. Weiss that were created, developed or 
manufactured post-hearing. This Court should reverse the Commission's unfair decision to give 
greater weight to Dr. Weiss' new 1 different post-hearing opinions which were not properly 
disclosed to Claimant prior to the 12.19.08 hearing. 
(8) THE DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT DR. WEISS WAS NOT COMPETENT TO 
RENDER A CAUSATION OPINION BECAUSE HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT 
THE HAZARDS OF THE CLAIMANT'S SAWYER I ASSEMBLER JOB BUT 
THEN CLAIM THAT A LACK OF FOUNDATION IS IRRELEVANT 
Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that he was not competent to render a medical causation 
opinion in this case because he did p& review the Claimant's written job description before 
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conducting his 10.1.08 IME examination (Dep., p. 34, L1. 15-22), he did ask the Claimant a 
single question about his work activities during the 10.1.08 IME examination (Dep., p. 46, L. 25 
- p. 47, L. 3) (Tr., p. 51, L1. 10-12), and he did not review the Claimant's hearing testimony 
describing his work activities before he gave his post-hearing medical opinions (Dep., p. 34, L1. 
The Defendants have admitted that Dr. Weiss knew absolutely nothing about the specific 
hazards of the Claimant's Sawyer [Assembler job duties prior to issuing his 10.1.08 IME report 
and his new / different 1.27.09 post-hearing deposition opinions, but have taken the incredible 
position that Dr. Weiss' lack of a proper factual foundation for his medical opinions on the most 
fundamental issue in this case (causation) is com~letelv irrelevant. 
First, he argues the Commission, and now this Court, should discount or entirely 
ignore Dr. Weiss' opinions because he did not review Claimant's job description 
or hearing testimony, or ask Claimant about his job, before issuing his IME report 
or giving his deposition. See, e.g., C1. Brief p. 13, 25. While true, this is 
com~letelv irrelevant. (Resp. Br., p. 12, L1.2-6) (emphasis supplied). 
The Claimant is bewildered by the Defendants' position. This Court did not find it 
completely irrelevant in Page II when a medical expert did not have a proper factual foundation 
to issue a medical stability opinion because he did not first examine the patient before issuing his 
opinion: 
Dr. Petersen was the only person to testify Page achieved clinical stability on that 
date, and the Commission noted it placed great weight on his testimony. It is 
unrebutted that Dr. Petersen's statement was not based u ~ o n  an examination of 
Page or other medical follow-up. Therefore, contrary to the Commission's 
conclusion, a subsequent letter from Dr. Petersen stating that Page had not 
actually achieved medical stability on November 26, 2001, combined with the 
absence of any other evidence in the record to support the Commission's fmding 
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of medical stability constitute a sufficient factual basis to warrant review of the 
case to correct a manifest iniustica This is not to say that every medical 
provider who changes their mind provides grounds for an argument of "manifest 
injustice." Here, there was no evidence to suawort Dr. Petersen's original 
opinion of clinical stability and then when the relevant facts were brought to his 
attention he reviewed his record and appropriately revised his opinion. Thus, the 
Commission's denial of Page's motion for review to correct a manifest injustice is 
reversed and the case is remanded. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc. (Page 14, 145 
Idaho 302,306, 179 P.3d 265,269 (2008) (emphasis supplied). 
I.R.E. 703 describes the factual foundation that must support an expert's opinion: 
The facts or data in the particular case uwon which an exaert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those aerceived bv or made known to the exaert at or 
before the hearing. (emphasis supplied). 
Since it is unrebntted that Dr. Weiss did not perceive or know any facts about the 
hazards of the Claimant's Sawyer / Assembler job at or before the time he issued his medical 
opinions, none of Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different medical opinions relied on by the Commission to 
deny this claim were supported by a proper factual foundation and all of them should be 
excluded: 
The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 903 P.2d 730 (1995). 
~ x a i r t  opinion must be based upon a i r o ~ e r  factual foundation. ~ r o h l e ~  ;
Garey, 132 Idaho 807,811,979 P.2d 1165,1169 (1999). 
*** 
We have held that it is incumbent naon an expert to set forth saecific facts 
uaon which an opinion is based. J-U-B Engineers v. Security Ins., 146 Idaho 
311,316,193 P.3d 858,863 (2008). 
[Tlhe Commission concluded that the letter did not contain substantial evidence 
that was contrary to the presumption that the injury arose out of the employee's 
employment. In doing so, the Commission stated, among other things, that 
"uncertain foundation" for the oainion contained in the letter caused the 
Commission to conclude that the surgeon's "opinion is not evidence which a 
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reasonable mind would accept to support a Cunclusion. Politre v Idaho 
Departaierir of Transportation arid Srate Inszrrance Fund, 126 Idaho 270,272, 882 
When a medical expert testifies that exposure to hazard "A" did not cause occupational 
disease "B", but then admits that he did not know anything about hazard ''A", by definition, that 
medical expert's causation opinion lacks a proper factual foundation (i.e., is based on pure 
speculation) and does p& constitute substantial and competent evidence that a reasonable mind 
would accept to support a conclusion. The Commission erred when it gave greater weight to the 
opinions of Dr. Weiss in this case. 
(9) THE FACTS AND MEDICAL OPINIONS OF THIS CASE ARE CLOSELY 
ANALOGOUS TO FLORES 
The important parallels between the facts and medical opinion evidence in this case and 
Flores v. Boise Cascade, I1 0420 (2008) have been argued extensively by the Claimant before 
the Commission and on appeal (See Arguments 7 and 8 in Appellant's Brief at pp. 38-35). The 
Claimant will not repeat those arguments here. The Defendants argue that ''the Commission 
found facts differently than in Flores and thus reached a different conclusion. That conclusion 
should not be disturbed on appeal." (Resp. Br., p. 22, LL. 17-19). However, it is important to 
note that the onlv 2 distinctions the Commission relied on in its decision when it attempted to 
distinguish this case from Flores were that: (1) the Claimant in this case did not work with a 
particular machine; and (2) the Claimant in this case did not engage in constant or repetitive 
activity. The Claimant has already established that both of the Commission's purported factual 
distinctions were erroneous because they were directly contradicted by the evidence in the record 
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(See pp. 32-35 of Appellant's 3.9.10 Brief). The other alleged distinctions argued by the 
Defendants were not relied on by the Commission in this case do not merit discussion. 
What is important to remember from Flores is that the Industrial Commission adopted 
the consensus of medical opinion from both the Claimant's attending physician and the 
Defendants' IME experts and found that a causal relationship existed between the Claimant's 
exposure to the hazards of repetitive lifting, twisting and bending and the Claimant's 
degenerative disc diseuse and disc herniation: 
The consensus of medical opinion is that the bending, lifting, and twisting 
activities of Claimant's work were implicated in causing his degenerative disc 
disease and disc herniation. Defendants do not dispute that Claimant's job 
required frequent bending, lifting and twisting . . . Flores, supra, at 1/47 on p. 19. 
I think on a more probable than not basis his current symptoms and his disc 
herniation at L4-5 on the left are related to his work in that he has to do repetitive 
bending, lifting and twisting primarily on the left. Although this gentleman does 
not have a specific traumatic episode, trip and fall, or a classic identifying injury I 
think this represents a repetitive injury to his low back. Id. at 720 on p. 9. 
Claimant's work as the slitter operator probably contributed the most to 
Claimant's second lumbar herniation, and the continuous lifting and twisting that 
this job required was not comparable to manual labor work in general. Id. at 1/32 
onp. 13. 
Dr. Weiss did not even take the time to review the Claimant's written job description (Ex. 
3) or ask the Claimant a single question about the hazards of his job duties, and yet the 
Commission gave his medical causation opinions greater weight than the opinions of Dr. Frizzell 
and Dr. Bates (who both read and considered the hazards in the Claimant's written job 
description) and the consensus of medical opinion in Flores. The facts and medical opinion 
evidence in Flores are closely analogous to this case and support award of benefits to the 
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Claimant. 
(10) NELSON IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TJ3AT MUST BE RAISED AND 
PROVED BY THE DEFENDANTS 
This Court's holding in Nelson v. Ponsness Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho 192, 
879 P.2d 492 (1994) only applies in those cases where the Claimant is seeking compensation for 
the aggravation of a preexisting condition. This is not a Nelson type case. The Claimant in this 
case did not have a preexisting condition in his low back when he filed his non-acute lumbar 
spine occupational disease claim 4. 
If the Claimant did suffer from a preexisting condition in his low back when he filed this 
occupational disease claim, it would have been the Defendants' duty to investigate the claim, 
determine whether there were any facts to support the finding of a preexisting condition and then 
raise the Nelson defense. Affirmative defenses must be raised and proved by the Defendants - 
not disproved by the Claimant as part of his case-in-chief. Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting & 
Body Works, 128 Idaho 747,752,918 P.2d 1192,1197 (1996). 
The Industrial Commission properly characterized the Nelson doctrine as an affirmative 
defense and asked the Defendants if they intended to raise that affirmative defense at the 
12.19.08 hearing: 
REFEREE POWERS: And I'm also under the understanding that this is being 
brought forward as an occupational disease claim versus an accident or are you 
going to argue both? 
MR. KALLAS: No, Your Honor. We are limited to an occupational disease in 
this case. There never was an accident. 
REFEREE POWERS: Okay. And is this involving a Nelson type defense or -- 
"ee Arguments 10(A)- I O Q  at pp. 37-47 of Appellant's 3.9.10 Brief. 
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MR. HARMON: No, Your Honor. 
REFEREE POWERS: Okay. All right. And have I stated the issue correctly? 
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your Honor. But implicit within that issue I assume the 
claimant has to meet its [sic] pis] burden of proving a compensable occupational 
disease first. 
REFEREE POWERS: Yes. (Tr., p. 4, L. 17 -p. 5, L. 7) (emphasis supplied). 
In its Order on Reconsideration, the Commission again referred to this Court's holding in 
Nelson as being a "defense" : 
The Nelson defense was not a noticed issue but whether Claimant incurred an 
occupational disease was a noticed issue. The Supreme Court's ruling in Nelson is 
not an optional law that the Commission can ignore if the parties so request. 
Nelson deals with the threshold compensability of an occupational disease (R., p. 
175, L1.2-5) (emphasis supplied). 
The Commission made it clear that it was the Defendants' burden of raising and proving 
the Nelson defense. The Workers' Compensation Act does not contain any provision that 
requires the Claimant to disprove the NeZson defense as part of his case-in-chief. The burden of 
raising and proving the Nelson defense has always rested with the Defendants and that is where it 
should remain. 
If the Commission takes it upon itself to sua sponte raise affirmative defenses that have 
already been waived by the Defendants and then applies those affirmative defenses to deny 
claims, the Commission starts to look more like an advocate and less like a fair and impartial 
tribunal. Following this logic to the extreme, the Commission would have a duty to raise every 
conceivable affirmative defense that finds support in existing law in every single case regardless 
of whether that defense was raised by the Defendants in their pleadings or waived on the record. 
This is not the proper role of a fair and impartial tribunal. The Nelson defense was not properly 
raised and proved by the Defendants and never should have been relied on by the Commission to 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
deny this claim. 
(11) THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD TO PROVE A PREEXISTING LOW BACK CONDITION THAT 
COULD SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION FOR APPLICATION OF THE 
NELSON DEFENSE 
The Defendants disregard the overwhelming weight of evidence in the record and 
continue to argue that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting condition in his low back. The 
evidence in the record does support the finding of a preexisting condition. Each of the 
Defendants' preexisting condition arguments will be rehted below with the evidence in the 
record. 
(a) Prior to Working For Joslin The Claimant Did Not Complain to Another Em~lover That 
Iie Wanted to Get Out of the D M 1  Business Due to Back Pain 
(See Resp. Br., p. 2, L1.6-8; p.25, L1.7-9) 
The Defendants misstate the record when they represent the following statement as a fact 
from Ex. 2 instead of the Industrial Commission's misquote of a hearsay statement which is what 
it actually is: 
"Prior to his employment with Joslin, Claimant had complained to his supervisor 
that he wanted to get out of the drywall business because it was causing him back 
pain. (Resp. Br., p. 2, L1.6-8). 
Exhibit 2 consists of 2 hearsay statements from the Claimant's former supervisor at 
Joslin, Brian Leisten. Mr. Leisten alleged in his hearsay statements that the Claimant told hi 
during his initial job interview with Joslin that he had experienced soreness in his "elbow, 
shoulder and back" while working as a sheet rocker and was looking to get into a different line of 
work (Ex. 2, p. 002001). The Commission misquoted this hearsay statement and read it to say 
Appellant's Reply Brief Page 36 
that "prior to the commencement of his employment by Joslin, Claimant had comalained to 
another emplover that he hoped to get out of the drywall business because it was causing him 
low back pain": 
Also, prior to the commencement of his employment by Joslin, Claimant had 
complained to another employer that he hoped to get out of the drywall business 
because it was causing him low back pain. Claimant's underlying degenerative 
joint disease and arthritis was certainly present in November 2007 and was not 
caused by his work. (R, p. 94,111, L1.9-11). 
This erroneous finding was important to the outcome of this case because the Industrial 
Commission based its key Nelson finding that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting condition 
in his low back on the Commission's misquote of a hearsay statement. The Claimant asked the 
Commission to correct his erroneous finding on reconsideration (R., p. 111, 71 1), but the 
Commission refused: 
Claimant was questioned about this statement and his testimony was that prior 
work caused pain in his elbow but not his back. Hearing Transcript, p. 17 . Yet, 
the sentence quoted above is supported in the record by the statement of 
Claimant's production supervisor. Claimant's Exhibit 2. (R., p. 172,93, L1.4-7). 
The Claimant gave uncontroverted testimony at the 12.19.08 hearing and denied telling 
Mr. Leisten that he got out of the sheet rocking business due to back pain: 
Q Okay. Well, during this leisurely conversation that you had with Mr. Listen 
[sic] [Leisten] in the truck on your first day of employment, did Mr. Listen 
ask you why you wanted to get out of the drywall business 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what did you tell him in response to that question? 
A I had been swinging an axe for, you know -- a hammer. I'm sorry. For nine 
years and my elbow just couldn't take the pressure anymore. 
Q During that conversation did you tell Mr. Listen that you also experienced 
soreness in your shoulder and back due to the physical demands of your job 
as a drywaller? 
A No, sir. (Tr., p. 17, L1. 8-22) (emphasis supplied). 
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The Claimant's denial was uncontxoverted. The Defendants did not call a single witness 
at hearing. Because the Commission's misquote of Mr. Leisten's hearsay statement is directly 
contradicted by his actual statements in Ex. 2, the Commission's erroneous finding must be must 
be reversed. 
In our view, this finding directly conflicts with the evidence that was before the 
Commission, and is not justified by our prior case law. This Court will overturn 
the Commission's findings of fact when such findings are unsupported by 
substantial competent evidence. Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Entev.,l26 
Idaho 129, 131, 879 P.2d 592,594 (1994). 
(b) The Claimant's 2 Prior Auto Accidents Did Not 1niure His Low Back 
(Resp. Br., p. 25, L1.9-13) 
The Defendants misstate the evidence in the record. The Claimant never suffered any 
injury to his low back in either of these 2 prior MVA accidents. The Claimant only complained 
of neck and upper back oain in his 5.16.06 motor vehicle accident (See Ex. A, pp. 1-2, Ex. 8, p. 
008041). There are no medical records in the record to support the Defendants' speculative 
argument that the Claimant might have suffered injury to his low back when he was in a motor 
vehicle accident with his grandfather at the age of 14. The Claimant' testimony at the 12.19.08 
hearing that he did not suffer any injury to his low back is uncontroverted: 
Q Did you require any medical treatment in connection with that single 
vehicle roll-over accident? 
A No, sir. 
Q Did you suffer any injuries to your low back in that roll-over accident? 
A No, sir. (Tr., p. 14, L1.7-12) (emphasis supplied). 
(c) 2 Visits To Dr. Meissner in December of 2005 Do Not Support The Commission's 
Preexisting Condition Findinvs 
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(Resp. Br., p. 2, L1. 1-5; p. 25, L1.4-6). 
The Commission erroneously found that the Claimant suffered from the preexisting 
conditions of underlying &itis (R., p. 94, 710, L. 5), degenerative disc disease and facet 
arthritis (R., p. 94, Ill, L. 6), and underlying degenerative joint disease and arthritis (R., p. 94, 
71 1, L. 12). The Claimant explained why 2 trips to a chiropractor in December of 2005 with a 
transitory complaint of low back pain (no left leg radiculopathy) did not constitute a substantial 
and competent basis to support the Commission's findings (See Claimant's rebuttal Arguments 
10(C) - 10(E) at pp. 40-44 of Appellant's 3.9.10 Brief). 
The record in this case does not contain any substantial and competent evidence to 
support the Commission's finding of the severe preexisting conditions that it found. The 
Defendants appear to concede that the Nelson defense should never have been a part of this case 
when they ask the Court to affirm the Commission's denial based on the "relative weighing of 
the opinions of Dr. Weiss and Dr. Frizzell upon which the case turned." (Resp. Br., p. 26, L1.21- 
(12) THlE DEFENDANTS EFFECTIVELY CONCEDE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE LAW OF NELSON AND ITS PROGENY 
The Claimant explained in his 3.9.10 Appellant's Brief how the Industrial Commission 
misapplied the law of Nelson and its progeny and made erroneous findings of fact to support its 
conclusion that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting condition in his low back that could 
trigger the Nelson defense (See Arguments 10(A) - 10(F) at pp. 37-47 of Appellant's 3.9.10 
Brief). 
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The Defendants did not dispute the Claimant's argument that this Court's holding in 
Sundquist, supra, 141 Idaho 450,455, 11 1 P.2d 135,140 (2000) precluded the Commission from 
fmding a preexisting condition based on the facts in this case because Sundquist requires the 
preexisting condition to be a " pre-existing injury caused by an accident": 
Unlike in DeMain, here the record contains no suggestion Sundqnist's pain 
resulted from having aggravated a pre-exist in^ iniurv caused bv an accident. 
Consequently, the holding in DeMain does not apply to the present facts. Id 141 
Idaho 450,455, 11 1 P.3d 135, 140 (2000) (emphasis supplied). 
The Commission did not find that the Claimant suffered from a "pre-existing injury 
caused by an accident" as required by Sundquist. The Commission specifically found that the 
Claimant's low back pain in December of 2005 came on without an accident: 
Dr. Meissner's records from December 2005 reflect that Claimant's low back 
pain arose without accident and was first noted on a Sunday, while at home (R., 
p. 94,711, L1. 8-9) (emphasis supplied). 
Since the Defendants did not dispute that the Commission misapplied the Sundquist 
definition of what constitutes a "pre-existing condition" under Nelson, the Court should treat the 
Defendants' failure to rebut this argument as a concession by the Defendants that the 
Commission misapplied the law. 
The Defendants also failed to dispute the Claimant's argument that the Commission 
misapplied the law when it gave retroactive application to the results of the Claimant's 1.23.08 
MRI scan in order to support its speculative finding that the Claimant suffered from a preexisting 
condition in his low back which did not exist. The Defendants did not dispute that Nelson and 
its progeny all require that the pre-existing condition be diagnosed and 1 or verified with 
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contemporaneous medical testing prior to the date when the Claimant goes to work for 
Defendant Employer and I or prior to the date when his current occupational disease becomes 
manifest (See discussion of need for contemporaneous medical evidence to prove a pre-existing 
condition discussed at pp. 46-47 of Claimant's 3.9.10 Appellant's Brief). 
Since the Defendants did not dispute that the Commission misapplied the law of Nelson 
and its progeny by giving retroactive application to the results of the Claimant's 1.23.08 MRI in 
order to support its speculative finding that the Claimant suffered from a "pre-existing condition" 
in his low back, the Defendants have conceded this misapplication of the law. 
(13) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ON THE 
CAUSATION ISSUE 
The Commission's decision does not contain any reviewable findings of fact or 
conclusions of law which confirm that the Commission ever read or considered the medical 
opinions set forth in Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08 rebuttal report and Dr. Bates' 12.4.08 rebuttal report 
(R., p. 88-99) (R., pp. 170-178) (Ex. 8, p. 008041-008042) (Ex. 7, p. 007016-007017). The 
Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration and asked the Commission to amend paragraph 7 
of its: 6.8.09 decision to accurately reflect all of the evidence that the Claimant presented on the 
causation question, including Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08 rebuttal report and Dr. Bates' 12.4.08 
rebuttal report (R., p. 103,77(a)(4) - (5)). The Commission did not explain in its 10.14.09 Order 
on Reconsideration why it completely overlooked and I or ignored 67% of the Claimant's 
prima facie case medical evidence (i.e., the medical opinions in Dr. Frizzell's 10.30.08 rebuttal 
report and Dr. Bates' 12.4.08 rebuttal report). 
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When both the Claimant and the Defendants agree that causation is the decisive issue in 
the case and the Commission fails to make meaningful findings of fact on 67% of the medical 
evidence presented by Claimant to meet his burden of proving the causation issue, the 
Commission's ultimate decision on the causation issue would appear to be arbitrary because it is 
not based on a well reasoned analysis of all of the medical evidence in the record: 
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of 
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Zverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530, 
650 P.2d 669, 672 (1982). Cuvr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 690, 864 P.2d 132, 137 
(1993). 
The Commission also overlooked and failed to make findmgs on all of the post-hearing 
medical opinions from Dr. Weiss which supported a causal relationship between exposure to the 
hazards of repetitive heavy lifting, twisting and bending and the Claimant's lumbar spine 
occupational disease: 
(a) Dr. Weiss' admitted under oath that the Defendants did not provide him with any evidence 
to refute the Claimant's testimony that his job required him to engage in certain body 
postures and activities which are known to cause high impact to the back and significantly 
increase intradiscal pressure; i.e., repetitively lift, twist and bend at the waist (Dep., p. 50, 
L. 10 - p. 52, L. 19). 
(b) Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that combined bending, twisting and lifting activities at any 
level do not just aggravate back pain, but can actually cause impact activity to the back 
pep., p. 64, L1. 19-21). 
(c) Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that "if you bend, twist, and lift, what you're doing is 
you're putting increased pressure on one of the disks as opposed to using both of them, so 
that's going to increase it right there. And you're also increasing pressure on just part of 
the disk, instead of using the whole disk" pep.,  p. 66, L1. 16-21). 
(d) Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that the combined movement of lifting while bending 
forward at the waist would increase the load or pressure on the person's intervertebral 
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disks (Dep., p. 67, L1. 13-17). 
(e) Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that there is a relationship between certain body postures 
and activities and intxadiscal pressure (Dep., p. 62, L1. 15-17). 
(f) Dr. Weiss admitted under oath that L5-S1 disc herniations (like the one suffered by 
Claimant in November of 2007) were the most common type of disc herniations (Dep., p. 
59, L1.9-14), and, 
(g) Dr. Weiss admitted that in cases where a disc herniation is present, the person's doctor 
would limit the person from things that cause impact activity to the back, which are 
combined bending, twisting and lifting activity at any level (Dep., p. 64, L1. 19-21). 
The Claimant and this Court have no way of knowing from the record why the 
Commission chose to overlook 213 of the Claimant's medical evidence and all of Dr. Weiss' 
opinions which tended to establish a causal relationship between the Claimant's job duties and his 
lumbar spine disease on a more likely than not basis. By failing to make meaningful findings of 
fact on the critical causation issue, the Commission did not create a record that allows for 
meaningful appellate review. 
(14) CORRECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS' MISSTATEMENTS OF THE 
RECORD 
(A) The Defendants' Claim That Dr. Weiss Issued A Causation Opinion in His 10.1.08 IME 
&@& 
The Defendants have misstated the evidence in the record when they represent that Dr. Weiss 
issued a causation opinion in his 10.1.08 IME report: 
Dr. Weiss stated in his IME report that Claimant's degenerative disc disease was 
not causally related to his job. Weiss tr. 43:17-45:ll. (Resp. Br., p. 16, L1. 13-15) 
The Defendants did not cite to the actual page of Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report where 
this alleged causation opinion can be found because the alleged oainion does not exist. A 
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cazehl reading of his 10.1.08 IME report confirms that Dr. Weiss never issued a causation 
opinion (Ex. 14, pp. 014005-014009). 
In support of their contention that Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report contained a causation 
opinion, the Defendants quote the misstatements that were made by Dr. Weiss during his 1.27.09 
post-hearing deposition. However, just because Dr. Weiss testified incorrectly that he had issued 
a causation opinion in his 10.1.08 IME report, that does not mean that the causation opinion 
actually appears in his report. 
The only way to determine if Dr. Weiss actually issued a causation opinion in his 10.1.08 
IME report is to carefully examine the information in the "DISCUSSION" section on page 
014009 in the context of the 1 simple question that the Defendants asked Dr. Weiss to answer in 
their 10.1.08 IME engagement letter: 
In your opinion, i s n  and the recommended 
at L5-S1 a result of an occupational disease causallv related to his 
empfovment and occu~ation at Joslin Millwork? Please explain. (Ex. 14, p. 
014003) (emphasis supplied). 
Dr. Weiss never answered this 1 simple causation question anywhere in his 10.1.08 IME 
report. When asked during his deposition to show the Claimant exactly where he answered the 
causation question in his 10.1.08 IME report, Dr. Weiss vacillated from page 43 to page 45 of his 
deposition and then testified: 
... that paragraph ["DISCUSSION] says that in my opinion it's not causal on a 
more likely than not basis pep . ,  p. 45, L1. 3-5). 
The causation opinion that Dr. Weiss alleges he made in his IME report simply does not 
exist. The Defendants and Dr. Weiss have both misrepresented the information in Dr. Weiss' 
report. 
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(B) The Defendants' Claim That They Disclosed All Medical Exuert Opinion Evidence They w p  
Hearing 
The Defendants make the incredible claim that they made proper disclosure of "all expert 
evidence" that they would rely on at hearing and in Dr. Weiss' post-hearing deposition prior to 
the 12.19.08 hearing: 
Defendants presented Claimant - prior to hearing - with all expert evidence on 
which they would rely at hearing and in the post-hearing deposition and briefs 
(Resp. Br., p. 4, L1. 12-14) (emphasis supplied). 
The Defendants misrepresent the record because the aIleged pre-hearing disclosures do 
appear anywhere in Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report and that report contained the only 
medical opinion evidence disclosed by the Defendants prior to the hearing. 
(C) The Defendants' Claim that Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates Had The Opportunitv to Issue 
Rebuttal Opinion 
The Defendants state that both Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates had the opportunity to issue 
rebuttal opinion. 
Second, Claimant himself admits he provided Dr. Weiss' IME to his experts, Drs. 
Frizzell and Bates, prior to hearing.15 Cl. Briefp. 13-14. Those doctors thus had 
the opporhnity to respond and provide a "rebuttal opinion." (Resp. Br., p. 16, L1. 
16-19). 
The Defendants' argument is misleading. Dr. Frizzell and Dr. Bates never had the 
opportunity to rebut Dr. Weiss' 14 new / different post-hearing deposition opinions because the 
Defendants did not make proper disclos.ure of those opinions before the hearing in Dr. Weis' 
10.1.08 IME report. Although the Claimant forwarded Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report to both Dr. 
Frizzell and Dr. Bates and requested their rebuttal reports, their rebuttal opinions were, of 
necessity, limited to the 1 opinion and 3 generic observations stated in Dr. Weiss' report (See Ex. 
7,  pp. 007016-007017 and Ex. 8, pp. 008041-008042). 
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(15) THE CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CODE $72-804 
The Defendants represent to this Court that the "paramount" reasonable ground they 
relied on to deny this claim was Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report: 
To begin, the paramount "reasonable eroundtl on which Respondents denied 
benefits was the opinions of Dr. Weiss (Resp. Br., p. 27, L1. 18-19) (emphasis 
supplied). 
The Defendants misrepresent the record because they admitted in their answer to 
interrogatory 18 that they made the decision to deny this claim on 6.17.08 - almost 4 months 
before Dr. Weiss conducted his 10.1.08 IME examination of the Claimant (Ex. 12, p. 012013). 
Even after receipt of Dr. Weiss' 10.1.08 IME report, the Defendants still did have 
any "reasonable ground" to deny this claim because Dr. Weiss did a t  address any element in 
the prima facie case for an occupational disease claim, Dr. Weiss did answer the 1 causation 
question that the Defendants asked him to answer and Dr. Weiss' opinions were not supported 
by proper factual foundation and therefore were totally unreliable (Ex. 14, pp. 014005-014009). 
At the time of the 12.19.08 hearing, the Defendants had not disclosed 1 adverse fact (Ex. 
12) or 1 adverse medical opinion (Ex. 12 and Ex. 14) to support their denial of this claim. The 
Defendants denied this claim from their initial receipt of Dr. Frizzell's 5.5.08 PFC letter to the 
12.19.08 hearing without any factual, medical or legal defense whatsoever. The Claimant should 
receive an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to under Idaho Code 572-804. 
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Conclusion 
The uncontroverted factual evidence and medical opinion evidence in the record at the 
time of the 12.19.08 hearing proves that the Claimant met his burden of proving a prima facie 
case for an occupational disease claim and was entitled to receive worker's compensation 
benefits as a matter of law because the Defendants admitted he met his burden of proof and 
failed to come forward with substantial evidence to contradict the Claimant's properly disclosed 
evidence. This Court should reverse the Commission's misapplications of the law and erroneous 
findings of fact and award the Claimant the following sure and certain relief promised to him by 
Idaho Code $72-201: 
1. All reasonable medical benefits required by the ~laim'ant's attending physicians to 
treat his non-acute occupational disease and / or needed for a reasonable time after the 
manifestation of his disease pursuant to Idaho Code $72-432(1); 
2. All temporary disability / income benefits that the Claimant is entitled to receive 
during his period of recovery pursuant to Idaho Code $72-408, $72-409 and $72-419; 
and, 
3. All attorney's fees and costs incurred at every stage of this case pursuant to Idaho 
Code 872-804 and I.A.R. 41. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of April, 2010. 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco, PLLC 
Attorney For Claimant / Appellant 
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